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12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

13 COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

14 BEAVER COUNTY EMPLOYEES ) Lead Case No. CGC-14-538355  
15 RETIREMENT FUND, et al., Individually and ) (Consolidated with No. CGC-14-539008)  
on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, )  
16 ) CLASS ACTION  
Plaintiffs, )

17 vs. )

18 ) PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS  
CYAN, INC., et al., ) AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF  
19 ) MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF  
Defendants. ) CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND  
20 ) APPROVAL OF PLAN OF ALLOCATION

21 DATE: June 5, 2019  
22 TIME: 9:00 a.m.  
23 DEPT: 304  
DATE ACTION FILED: 04/01/14

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiffs Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, Retirement Board of Allegheny County  
3 and Delaware County Employees Retirement System (“Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this  
4 memorandum in support of their motion for final approval of the settlement of this class action on the  
5 terms set forth in the Amended Stipulation of Settlement dated December 6, 2018 (the “Stipulation” or  
6 “Settlement”), and for approval of the proposed Plan of Allocation of the Net Settlement Fund.<sup>1</sup>

7 The Settlement provides for payment by or on behalf of Defendants of \$15,000,000 for the  
8 benefit of the Class.<sup>2</sup> This substantial Settlement is the culmination of vigorous litigation among the  
9 Parties<sup>3</sup> over more than four years, including argument before the United States Supreme Court on an  
10 important jurisdictional issue, and is the product of arm’s-length negotiations between the Parties with  
11 the substantial assistance of the Honorable Layn Phillips (Ret.), one of the nation’s most well-respected  
12 and effective mediators of securities class actions. The Settlement resolves all claims against  
13 Defendants. Lead Counsel believes that the Settlement represents a highly favorable result for the Class  
14 and warrants this Court’s approval.

15 As further discussed below, the Settlement should be presumed fair because it was reached  
16 through arm’s-length bargaining and Lead Counsel’s investigation and prosecution of this case assured  
17 that Plaintiffs entered into the Settlement on a fully informed basis. Further, Lead Counsel is  
18  
19

20 <sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise defined herein, all capitalized terms have the meanings ascribed to them in the  
Stipulation.

21 <sup>2</sup> “Class” means the Class certified by the Court in its Order dated May 18, 2015; *i.e.*, all Persons who  
22 purchased or otherwise acquired Cyan common stock from May 9, 2013 to November 4, 2013, except  
23 for purchases or acquisitions of non-registered shares in a private transaction. Excluded from the Class  
24 are Defendants and their respective successors and assigns; past and current officers and directors of  
25 Cyan and the Underwriter Defendants; members of the immediate families of the Individual  
Defendants; the legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of the Individual Defendants; any  
entity in which any of the above excluded persons have or had a majority ownership interest; and any  
Person who validly requested exclusion from the Class.

26 <sup>3</sup> “Parties” shall mean Plaintiffs and Defendants Cyan, Mark A. Floyd, Michael W. Zellner, Michael  
27 L. Hatfield, Paul A. Ferris, Promod Haque, M. Niel Ransom, Michael J. Boustridge, Robert E. Switz,  
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Jefferies LLC, and KeyBanc Capital Markets  
28 Inc.

1 experienced in securities class action litigation, and there have been no objections to the Settlement or  
2 Plan of Allocation to date.

3           Moreover, there is nothing to rebut the presumption of fairness. While Plaintiffs and Lead  
4 Counsel believe that the litigation has substantial merit and they would have prevailed at trial, they  
5 considered the numerous risks raised by the arguments Defendants made during the case and in  
6 settlement negotiations, as well as the risks in establishing liability and damages at trial. At trial, the  
7 jury could have sided with Defendants on some or all of the determinative issues, leaving the Class with  
8 little or no recovery.

9           Lead Counsel, well-respected and experienced in prosecuting shareholder class actions, has  
10 concluded that the Settlement is a highly favorable result and in the best interest of the Class. This  
11 conclusion is based on, among other things, the substantial recovery obtained when weighed against the  
12 significant risk, expense and delay presented in continuing this litigation through trial and probable  
13 appeal; a complete analysis of the evidence obtained; past experience in litigating complex actions  
14 similar to the present action; and the serious disputes among the Parties on both merits and damages  
15 issues.

16           For these and other reasons set forth below, as well as those set forth in the previously filed  
17 Declaration of John K. Grant in Support of Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement  
18 (“Grant Decl.”), dated November 5, 2018,<sup>4</sup> Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final  
19 approval to the Settlement and approve the Plan of Allocation as fair, reasonable, and adequate to Class  
20 Members.<sup>5</sup>

21  
22  
23  
24 <sup>4</sup> The Grant Declaration details Plaintiffs’ claims, the procedural history of the litigation, the efforts  
25 of Lead Counsel in prosecuting this case, the risks of continued litigation, and why the Settlement is in  
the best interests of the Class.

26 <sup>5</sup> This memorandum focuses primarily upon the legal standards for approving the Settlement, and  
27 evaluating the Plan of Allocation. A separate memorandum is being submitted herewith in support of  
the motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. For a complete factual recitation, Lead  
28 Counsel respectfully refers the Court to the Grant Declaration, incorporated by reference herein.

1 **II. THE SETTLEMENT IS FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE AND**  
2 **WARRANTS FINAL APPROVAL**

3 **A. Standards Governing Final Approval of Class Action Settlements**

4 “A class action shall not be dismissed, settled, or compromised without the approval of the  
5 court.” Cal. Civ. Code §1781(f). When assessing a proposed class action settlement, the court’s  
6 inquiry centers on whether the settlement is “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” *Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.*,  
7 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996). The inquiry ““must be limited to the extent necessary to reach a  
8 reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion  
9 between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and  
10 adequate to all concerned.”” *Id.*<sup>6</sup>

11 Accordingly, the Court need not inquire into the result that might have been obtained at trial.  
12 *See Wershba v. Apple Comput., Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 245 (2001), *overruled on other grounds by*  
13 *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.*, 4 Cal. 5th 260 (2018). A review of the likely rewards of  
14 settlement and the risks and costs of continued litigation suffices. *See N. Cty. Contractor’s Ass’n v.*  
15 *Touchstone Ins. Servs.*, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1091 (1994) (court must determine if settlement is in the  
16 “ballpark”). ““In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and  
17 approval are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.”” *Nat’l Rural*  
18 *Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 221 F.R.D. 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004).<sup>7</sup> Further, longstanding  
19 public policy strongly favors settlements. *See, e.g., Hamilton v. Oakland Sch. Dist.*, 219 Cal. 322, 329  
20 (1933) (“[I]t is the policy of the law to discourage litigation and to favor compromises.”). This policy  
21 becomes an “overriding public interest” in class actions. *Bell v. Am. Title Ins. Co.*, 226 Cal. App. 3d  
22 1589, 1608 (1991).

23 In determining whether a settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, there is a “presumption of  
24 fairness . . . where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and  
25 discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in

26 <sup>6</sup> Unless otherwise noted, citations are omitted throughout.

27 <sup>7</sup> California courts also look to the standards developed by federal courts in reviewing and approving  
28 class action settlements. *See, e.g., La Sala v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n*, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 872 (1971).



1 similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small.” *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802; *see*  
2 *also Cellphone Termination Fee Cases*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1389 (2010) (same).

3 The court in *Dunk* set forth additional factors to be considered along with this presumption,  
4 including (1) the settlement amount; (2) the risks of continued litigation; (3) the stage of proceedings;  
5 (4) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation absent settlement; (5) the experience  
6 and views of class counsel; and (6) the reaction of class members. 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801. As  
7 discussed below, the Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness, and readily satisfies the  
8 additional *Dunk* factors.

9 **B. The Settlement Should Be Accorded a Presumption of Fairness**

10 The Settlement is presumptively fair.

11 *First*, the Parties negotiated the Settlement at arm’s length under the direct supervision of  
12 former Judge Layn Phillips (Ret.), a highly experienced and effective mediator in cases like this. *See In*  
13 *re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig.*, No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26635, at \*7 (N.D.  
14 Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) (finding Judge Phillips to be “an experienced mediator”); *In re Bear Stearns Cos.*,  
15 909 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (approving settlement when parties “engaged in extensive  
16 arm’s length negotiations, which included multiple sessions mediated by retired federal Judge Layn R.  
17 Phillips, an experienced and well-regarded mediator of complex securities cases”); *Int’l Bhd. of Elec.*  
18 *Workers Local 697 Pension Fund v. Int’l Game Tech, Inc.*, No. 3:09-cv-00419-MMD-WGC, 2012 WL  
19 5199742, at \*2 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2012) (settlement was fair when it “was reached following arm’s  
20 length negotiations between experienced counsel that involved the assistance of an experienced and  
21 reputable private mediator, retired Judge Phillips”). The negotiations included two day-long mediation  
22 sessions during which the Parties’ positions on merits and damages issues were discussed, as well as  
23 extensive follow-up negotiations, all of which were informed by detailed mediation briefs and  
24 supporting materials exchanged in advance of the negotiations. *See* Grant Decl., ¶¶26, 38-39.

25 *Second*, the Parties engaged in extensive pretrial investigation and discovery and other  
26 proceedings to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and defenses, and therefore entered  
27 into the Settlement on a fully informed basis. Lead Counsel, among other things:

1 (a) Conducted an extensive factual investigation of the events underlying Cyan's  
2 May 9, 2013 IPO;

3 (b) Retained an investigator to identify, locate, contact and interview potential  
4 witnesses, including former Cyan and Cyan customer employees;

5 (c) Supervised the investigation and participated in select interviews and reviewed  
6 interview memoranda prepared by the investigator;

7 (d) Reviewed and analyzed the representations made by the Company in the  
8 Registration Statement and Prospectus ("Registration Statement"), as well as subsequent U.S. Securities  
9 and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings;

10 (e) Reviewed and analyzed industry and securities analyst reports and  
11 comprehensive news reports, press releases and other media files concerning Cyan;

12 (f) Researched and filed initial and consolidated complaints;

13 (g) Briefed, opposed and prevailed against Defendants' demurrer seeking to dismiss  
14 this Action for failure to state a claim;

15 (h) Briefed, opposed and prevailed against Defendants' motion for judgment on the  
16 pleadings seeking to dismiss this Action for failure to state a claim;

17 (i) Researched and prepared to respond to Defendants' writ of mandate to the  
18 California First Appellate District and Defendants' petition for review to the California Supreme Court  
19 seeking to overturn Judge Munter's order denying Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings  
20 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

21 (j) Retained and consulted with specialist counsel with experience before the United  
22 States Supreme Court to assist in preparing briefs for that Court and arguing the matter;

23 (k) Prepared and filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' petition for writ of  
24 certiorari to the United States Supreme Court;

25 (l) Prepared and submitted a brief to the United States Solicitor's office opposing  
26 granting Defendants' petition for writ of certiorari, and met with representatives of the Solicitor's office  
27 to discuss the merits of granting or denying certiorari;

28

1 (m) Prepared and filed papers with the United States Supreme Court opposing the  
2 appeal to the Supreme Court;

3 (n) Prepared for and argued before the United States Supreme Court, through  
4 specially retained counsel, the hearing addressing the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts to  
5 entertain cases brought pursuant to §11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”);

6 (o) Responded to Defendants’ discovery requests and defended Plaintiffs’  
7 depositions;

8 (p) Retained and consulted with a damages expert regarding the calculation of  
9 damages under the Securities Act;

10 (q) Moved for and obtained class certification and provided notice of the pendency  
11 of this litigation to Class Members;

12 (r) Obtained and reviewed over 500,000 pages of document discovery produced by  
13 Defendants pursuant to Plaintiffs’ requests;

14 (s) Took 22 depositions of Defendants, Cyan employees and other non-party  
15 witnesses;

16 (t) Prepared witnesses and defended four Plaintiff depositions;

17 (u) Retained two expert witnesses to provide expert opinions on the subjects of loss  
18 causation and underwriter due diligence;

19 (v) Analyzed the reports of and deposed Defendants’ two expert witnesses on the  
20 same subjects;

21 (w) Prepared for and defended the depositions of Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses;

22 (x) Prepared for and participated in two arm’s-length mediation sessions with the  
23 substantial assistance of the Hon. Layn Phillips (Ret.);

24 (y) Prepared and filed an affirmative motion for summary judgment against  
25 Defendants;

26 (z) Prepared and filed opposition briefs in response to Defendants’ motions for  
27 summary judgment; and

28

1 (aa) Prepared reply briefs in support of Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  
2 Grant Decl., ¶5. Given these substantial efforts, Lead Counsel plainly were in a position to negotiate  
3 the Settlement based on a fully informed evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims  
4 asserted, the defenses raised, and the risks of continued litigation.

5 **Third**, although the Court must independently review the Settlement, the judgment of  
6 experienced counsel regarding the Settlement is entitled to great weight and supports a presumption of  
7 fairness. *See Nat’l Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 528 (“‘Great weight’ is accorded to the recommendation of  
8 counsel, who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”); *Dunk*, 48 Cal.  
9 App. 4th at 1802. Lead Counsel here has extensive experience and expertise in the prosecution of  
10 securities class actions in federal and state courts throughout the country. *See* Grant Decl., ¶¶56-57 &  
11 Ex. A thereto (Robbins Geller resume). Lead Counsel fully supports the Settlement, and believes that  
12 the substantial and certain recovery of \$15,000,000 is a highly favorable result for the Class when  
13 weighed against the uncertainty and substantial risk and expense of continuing this litigation through  
14 trial and appeals. *Id.*, ¶¶48-55. The fact that qualified and well-informed counsel endorse the  
15 Settlement as being fair, adequate, and reasonable favors this Court’s approval of the Settlement.

16 **Fourth**, the reaction of the Class to the Settlement supports a presumption of fairness. Pursuant  
17 to the Court’s Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Notice Order”), more  
18 than 13,300 copies of the Notice of Proposed Settlement of Class Action (“Notice”) and Proof of Claim  
19 and Release (“Proof of Claim”) were sent to potential Class Members and their nominees. *See*  
20 Declaration of Carole K. Sylvester Regarding Notice Dissemination, Publication, and Requests for  
21 Exclusion Received (“Sylvester Decl.”), ¶¶4-12, submitted herewith. The Notice described the nature  
22 of the litigation, the terms of the Settlement, and the manner in which the Net Settlement Fund will be  
23 allocated among Class Members and an estimate of the per share recovery. The Notice also advised  
24 Class Members of their right to object and the procedures and deadline for objecting to the Settlement,  
25 the Plan of Allocation, or counsel’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. In addition,  
26 the Summary Notice was transmitted over *Business Wire* and published in *The Wall Street Journal* on  
27 January 31, 2019. *Id.*, ¶13. The Notice, Proof of Claim, Stipulation, Notice Order, and other relevant  
28

1 documents and information, including all deadlines, have been made publicly available on a case-  
2 dedicated website for the Settlement, www.CyanSecuritiesLitigation.com. *Id.*, ¶15.

3 Although Class Members have until April 25, 2019 to object to the Settlement, Lead Counsel is  
4 not aware of any objections to the Settlement or the Plan of Allocation as of the date hereof. The lack  
5 of objections by the Class to date supports a presumption of fairness.<sup>8</sup> *See 7-Eleven Owners for Fair*  
6 *Franchising v. Southland Corp.*, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135, 1153 (2000) (one factor that “lead[s] to a  
7 presumption the settlement was fair” is that only “a small percentage of objectors” came forward); *Nat’l*  
8 *Rural*, 221 F.R.D. at 529 (small number of objections raises strong presumption that settlement is fair).

9 **C. The Settlement Readily Satisfies the Additional *Dunk* Factors**

10 **1. The Amount of the Settlement Balanced Against the Strength of**  
11 **Plaintiffs’ Case Favors Approval**

12 Each of the additional *Dunk* factors supports final approval. Under the Settlement, Cyan has  
13 paid \$15,000,000 in cash for the benefit of the Class, with no right of reversion. This \$15,000,000  
14 Settlement, if approved, would be well within the range of court-approved settlements in recent years in  
15 class actions asserting federal statutory claims in California Superior Court for alleged material  
16 misstatements in the offering documents for a public stock offering.

17 Based on the assumption that Plaintiffs would meet their burden of proof and persuade the jury  
18 at trial as to each element of their *prima facie* claims, and that Plaintiffs would successfully rebut every  
19 affirmative defense Defendants intended to establish, maximum estimated damages could reach as high  
20 as \$67 million. Grant Decl., ¶41. Accordingly, the percentage of recovery is approximately 22%, well  
21 above the median settlement as a percentage of estimated damages courts have approved in cases only  
22 involving §11. *See* Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan & Laura E. Simmons, *Securities Class Action*  
23 *Settlements – 2017 Review and Analysis* at 9, Fig. 8 (Cornerstone Research 2018) (the “Cornerstone  
24 Research Report”) (analyzing 70 class action settlements asserting §§11 and/or 12(a)(2) claims filed  
25 between 2008 and 2017, and finding the median settlement as a percentage of “simplified statutory

26  
27 <sup>8</sup> If any objections are received, Plaintiffs will address them in a reply memorandum to be filed on  
28 May 29, 2019, in accordance with this Court’s Notice Order.



1 that occurred after the IPO that would not support a recovery for misrepresentations in the Registration  
2 Statement. *Id.* Defendants would also have argued that the Registration Statement contained numerous  
3 disclosures regarding the risks associated with Cyan’s business with Windstream, *see id.*, ¶50, and the  
4 uncertain nature of Cyan’s future operating results and revenue, *id.*, ¶51. While Plaintiffs have  
5 substantive responses to these arguments, the uncertainty of continued litigation weighs strongly in  
6 favor of approval of the Settlement. As one court has observed:

7           It is known from past experience that no matter how confident one may be of the  
8 outcome of litigation, such confidence is often misplaced. Merely by way of example,  
9 two instances in this Court may be cited where offers of settlement were rejected by  
10 some plaintiffs and were disapproved by this Court. The trial in each case then resulted  
11 unfavorably for plaintiffs; in one case they recovered nothing and in the other they  
12 recovered less than the amount which had been offered in settlement.

13 *W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.*, 314 F. Supp. 710, 743-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), *aff’d*, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.  
14 1971); *see also Bellows v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc.*, No. 3:07-cv-01413-W-AJB, 2008 WL 5458986, at \*7  
15 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2008) (“[W]hile Class Counsel believe strongly in the merit of the class claims, they  
16 also recognize that any case encompasses risks and that settlement of contested cases is preferred in this  
17 circuit. Indeed, even if Plaintiff were to prevail at trial, risks to the class remain.”); *In re Heritage Bond*  
18 *Litig.*, No. 02-ML-1475 DT, 2005 WL 1594403, at \*7 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“Also favoring  
19 approval of the Settlement is the knowledge that, while Plaintiffs are confident of the strength of their  
20 case, it is imprudent to presume ultimate success at trial and thereafter.”) (both citing *Chas. Pfizer*, 314  
21 F. Supp. at 743-44). The numerous uncertainties and risks of proving liability at and after trial support  
22 approval of the Settlement.

23           **b.       Risks Relating to Establishing Causation and Damages**

24           Although Plaintiffs were confident that they could establish damages assuming a finding of  
25 liability, Plaintiffs faced a risk that the Court or jury would substantially reduce or even eliminate  
26 damages. Under §11(e) of the Securities Act, a defendant can reduce or eliminate damages through a  
27 showing that the false or misleading statements or omissions alleged were not the cause, in whole or in  
28 part, of the loss sustained by the class. As noted above, Defendants intended to argue “negative  
causation” at both summary judgment and trial.

1 The Parties' respective experts would offer sharply divergent testimony concerning damages at  
2 both summary judgment and trial, reducing the determination of this element to a "battle of the  
3 experts." See *In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd.*, 535 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260-61 (D.N.H. 2007) (fact that "trial would  
4 likely involve a confusing 'battle of the experts' over damages" supported approval of settlement).  
5 Plaintiffs faced a substantial risk that the factfinder would credit Defendants' contentions that damages  
6 were not linked to the misstatements in the offering documents or that damages were a fraction of the  
7 amount Plaintiffs proffered. See *In re Warner Commc'ns Sec. Litig.*, 618 F. Supp. 735, 744-45  
8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (approving settlement where "it is virtually impossible to predict with any certainty  
9 which testimony would be credited, and ultimately, which damages would be found to have been  
10 caused by actionable, rather than the myriad nonactionable factors such as general market conditions"),  
11 *aff'd*, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).

12 Even if Plaintiffs were to obtain 100% of their damages, the risks would not end there. See *In re*  
13 *Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. Premium Litig.*, No. 96-CV-230 BTM (AJB), 1998 WL 1993385, at \*5 (S.D. Cal.  
14 Dec. 21, 1998) ("[E]ven if it is assumed that a successful outcome for plaintiffs at summary judgment  
15 or at trial would yield a greater recovery than the Settlement – which is not at all apparent – there is  
16 easily enough uncertainty in the mix to support settling the dispute rather than risking no recovery in  
17 future proceedings."). There are numerous cases in which a successful verdict has been overturned  
18 either by motion after trial or an appeal. In *In re Apple Comput. Sec. Litig.*, No. C-84-20148(A)-JW,  
19 1991 WL 238298, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 1991), for example, the jury rendered a verdict for plaintiffs  
20 after an extended trial. Based upon the jury's findings, recoverable damages would have exceeded  
21 \$100 million. The court, however, overturned the verdict, entered judgment for the individual  
22 defendants, and ordered a new trial with respect to the corporate defendant. See also, e.g., *Glickenhau*  
23 *& Co. v. Household Int'l, Inc.*, 787 F.3d 408, 433 (7th Cir. 2015) (reversing and remanding jury verdict  
24 of \$2.46 billion after 13 years of litigation on loss causation grounds and error in jury instruction under  
25 *Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders*, 564 U.S. 135 (2011)); *In re BankAtlantic Bancorp,*  
26 *Inc.*, No. 07-61542-CIV, 2011 WL 1585605, at \*20 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2011) (after plaintiffs' jury  
27 verdict, court granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law and entered judgment for  
28



1 defendants), *aff'd*, 688 F.3d 713 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding trial court erred, but defendants nevertheless  
2 entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on lack of loss causation). Litigation risks on liability and  
3 damages support approval of the Settlement.

4 **3. Plaintiffs Had Sufficient Information to Negotiate and Obtain a**  
5 **Fair Settlement**

6 This factor focuses on whether the Parties had sufficient information to conduct an informed  
7 negotiation for a settlement that adequately reflects the merits of the case.

8 As detailed above, when the Parties reached the Settlement, Lead Counsel had sufficiently  
9 investigated and researched the merits of its claims and Defendants’ potential defenses to determine that  
10 the terms of the Settlement are fair, reasonable, and adequate and in the best interests of the Class. Lead  
11 Counsel’s reasoned judgment was obtained after more than four years of litigation, during which time it  
12 briefed a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, appeals regarding subject matter  
13 jurisdiction, including a successful United States Supreme Court appeal; propounded multiple sets of  
14 written discovery requests on each Defendant group; reviewed over 500,000 pages of documents; took  
15 depositions of Defendant Cyan’s employees and other non-party witnesses; defended each of the  
16 Plaintiffs’ depositions and obtained class certification; retained experts and defended their depositions;  
17 took Defendants’ experts depositions; filed a motion for summary judgment; opposed Defendants’  
18 summary judgment motions; and participated in mediated settlement negotiations with Judge Phillips  
19 during which the strengths and weaknesses of the Parties’ positions were fully explored and debated.  
20 *See generally* Grant Decl. The knowledge and insight gained through these activities provided Lead  
21 Counsel with sufficient information to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Class’ claims and  
22 Defendants’ defenses, as well as the likelihood of obtaining a larger recovery from Defendants had the  
23 litigation continued.

24 Class action settlements are regularly approved after having completed similar or less discovery  
25 than that completed here. *See, e.g., Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 53 (2008) (class  
26 action settlement affirmed as fair, adequate, and reasonable when “before settling, the parties engaged  
27 in extensive discovery, including written discovery, document production, and depositions of key . . .  
28 employees” and where “[c]lass counsel had previously undertaken its own pre-filing investigation”); *see*

1 also, e.g., *Munoz v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles*, 186 Cal. App. 4th 399, 403 (2010)  
2 (final approval of class action affirmed when no depositions had been taken, just written discovery  
3 completed). This factor weighs significantly in favor of approval.

4 **4. Balancing the Certainty of an Immediate Recovery Against the**  
5 **Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of Continued**  
6 **Litigation and Trial Favors Settlement**

7 The immediacy and certainty of a recovery balanced against the complexity, expense and  
8 duration of continued litigation is another factor for the Court to balance in determining whether the  
9 Settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. *See Wershba*, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 244-45; *Dunk*, 48 Cal.  
10 App. 4th at 1801. The benefit of the present settlement must be balanced against the expense of  
11 achieving a more favorable result at a trial in the future.

12 Approval of the Settlement assures a prompt and significant recovery for Class Members. If not  
13 for the Settlement, this litigation would continue to proceed through the completion of summary  
14 judgment, trial, and likely appeal. A trial would occupy teams of attorneys for weeks and would require  
15 substantial and costly expert testimony on both sides. Further, a judgment favorable to the Class, in  
16 light of the contested nature of virtually every aspect of this case, would unquestionably be the subject  
17 of post-trial motions and appeals, which would prolong the case for several more years. *See Warner*  
18 *Comm'ns*, 618 F. Supp. at 745 (delay from appeals is a factor to be considered). Delay, not just at the  
19 trial stage, but through post-trial motions and the appellate process as well, could force Class Members  
20 to wait many more years for any recovery, further reducing its value. Settlement of this litigation  
21 ensures an immediate recovery, and eliminates the risk of no recovery at all.

22 The essence of a settlement is compromise, ““a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of  
23 highest hopes.”” *Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n*, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982). ““[T]he  
24 agreement reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for the saving of cost and  
25 elimination of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with  
26 litigation.”” *Id.* The certainty of recovery balanced against the complexity, expense, and duration of  
27 continued litigation weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement.

1                   **5. The Recommendation of Experienced Counsel Favor Approval of**  
2                   **the Settlement**

3                   The views of the attorneys actively conducting the litigation, while not conclusive, are entitled  
4 to weight in the fairness analysis. *Dunk*, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802; *see also In re Omnivision Techs.*,  
5 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1043 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be  
6 given a presumption of reasonableness.”). Lead Counsel, who has extensive experience in the  
7 prosecution of securities class actions, recommends the Settlement to the Court as in the best interests  
8 of the Class.<sup>10</sup> *See* Grant Decl., ¶¶56-58 & Ex. A thereto.

9                   In sum, because each of the *Dunk* factors supports a finding that the Settlement is fair,  
10 reasonable, and adequate, the Court should approve the Settlement.

11                   **III. THE PLAN OF ALLOCATION IS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND SHOULD**  
12                   **BE APPROVED**

13                   Plaintiffs also seek approval of the Plan of Allocation. The Plan of Allocation is set forth in full  
14 in the Notice mailed to potential Class Members. *See* Sylvester Decl., Ex. A at 4-5. Assessment of a  
15 plan of allocation in a class action is governed by the same standards of review applicable to the  
16 settlement as a whole – the plan must be fair and reasonable. *See Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle*, 955 F.2d  
17 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 1992). An allocation formula “need only have a reasonable, rational basis,  
18 particularly if recommended by experienced and competent” class counsel. *See, e.g., In re Zynga Inc.*  
19 *Sec. Litig.*, No. 12- cv-04007-JSC, 2015 WL 6471171, at \*12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2015). No objections  
20 to the Plan of Allocation have been filed to date.

21                   The Plan of Allocation provides an equitable basis to allocate the Net Settlement Fund among  
22 all Class Members who submit an acceptable Proof of Claim. The Plan of Allocation was developed by  
23 Lead Counsel with the assistance of its damages consultant, and follows the statutory framework for  
24 calculating damages under § 11(e) of the Securities Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that  
25 the Plan of Allocation is a fair and reasonable method for allocating the Net Settlement Fund among the  
26 members of the Class.

26 <sup>10</sup> The reaction of the Class is also relevant to the fairness of the Settlement. *See Dunk*, 48 Cal. App.  
27 4th at 1801. As noted above, there have been no objections to date. If any timely objections are  
28 submitted, Plaintiffs will address them in a reply memorandum. *See* note 8, *supra*.

1 **IV. CONCLUSION**

2 The Settlement reached by Lead Counsel is an excellent one, and for the foregoing reasons,  
3 Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court grant final approval to the Settlement, approve the Plan of  
4 Allocation, and enter the proposed Judgment.

5 DATED: March 25, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY LEXIS FILE AND SERVE XPRESS

I, the undersigned, declare:

1. That declarant is and was, at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and employed in the City and County of San Diego, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to or interested party in the within action; that declarant’s business address is 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900, San Diego, California 92101.

2. That on March 25, 2019, declarant served PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND APPROVAL OF PLAN OF ALLOCATION by serving electronically via Lexis File & Serve Xpress to the parties listed on the attached Service List.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 25, 2019, at San Diego, California.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
JACLYN STARK

CYAN

Service List - 3/25/2019 (14-0050)

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